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Abstract 
This article aims to contribute to the debate about the role of relational values in environmental decision 
making. It puts forward a typology of ‘human-nature relational models’ as a contribution to the valuation 
debate. We argue that human-nature relational models, by taking insights from several disciplines and 
stressing the notion of cognitive frameworks, can be useful to understand core drivers of individual and 
social behavior behind environmental change and socio-environmental conflicts. A ‘relational models’ 
approach calls for understanding the diversity of cognitive frameworks conditioning our interaction with 
nature, with the ultimate goal of avoiding, mitigating, transforming and resolving socio-environmental 
conflicts. 
1. Introduction
The ecosystem services framework (arguably a dominant paradigm for describing human-nature relations 
nowadays) reflects the emergence of an intellectual tradition that assumes that the best strategy to foster 
environmentalism is to appeal to instrumental values. According to this perspective, the role of valuation 
is to make these values visible, by making possible to capture and internalize them in decision making. 
Although the capacity of biocentric approaches to mobilize interest to conserve nature for its own sake is 
also acknowledged [1], the ecosystem services metaphor, while being a powerful communication tool, 
risks legitimizing an utilitarian and monist (based on a single measurement of value, e.g. money) 
discourse while downplaying the complex and manifold ways humans interact with nature and articulate 
the plurality of its values, and in particular the cultural and moral dimensions of such interactions1 [2, 3, 
4, 5].  
Moving away from the use (and misuse) of value monism and fostering a transition to a pluralistic 
valuation approach is at the heart of the Intergovernmental Platform of Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) [5], which explicitly recognizes that valuation itself is a value laden process and that 
emphasis should be placed in social learning and integrating/bridging diverse values, especially in 
contested spaces. This is akin to the view of Bryan Norton [3], who from an ethical perspective concurs 
that in the quest for transformative change towards sustainability “what is needed is a method for 
1 We adopt a broad notion of nature, which includes either non-human entities, categories that composes similar 
entities (e.g. species) or more complex natural environments in which different types of non-human entities interact 
(e.g. ecosystems), referred to a particular geographical location or to a larger scale. 
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evaluating change, a method that— unlike the current evaluative methods available today— can lead 
those with conflicting values to converge on actions that are agreed to improve unacceptable situations” 
(p.6). We agree with Norton that such an evaluative method can only come from pluralistic valuation 
approaches rather than from those that are based on value monism [3, 6]. 
As part of the debate around value pluralism, the dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental values has 
been questioned, based on the proposition that it fails to resonate with many lay people. It is argued that 
in their decisions, people often consider the properties of the relationships they hold with nature rather 
than the inherent worth of nature itself or the benefits they derive from it in instrumental ways. These 
considerations, namely the preferences, principles and virtues associated with relationships with and 
responsibilities towards nature, as conducive to a ‘good life’, both meaningful and satisfying, is what has 
been coined as relational values [5;7]. The main objective of this article is to contribute to the theoretical 
debate around the notion of relational values by putting forward two propositions, namely:  
1) It is possible to identify and categorize a finite number of discrete human-nature relational models 
(RMs). We propose an elementary typology of such RMs, each of them having their own ‘grammar’, 
encompassing several dimensions (see below for definitions for explanations).  
2) What have been called ‘instrumental values’ correspond to one of those RMs, namely, ‘utilization’. 
Similarly, intrinsic values are related to an alternative RM that allocates a particular set of rights to nature 
(e.g., ‘wardship’). Lastly, the common use of the term ‘relational values’ may be associated with other 
RMs, such as ‘stewardship’ or ‘ritualized exchange’ (see explanations below, including descriptions in 
Table1). We propose that all three fuzzy categories of values (instrumental, relational and intrinsic) are 
indeed ‘relational’ in the sense that they are all derived from different cognitive frameworks that shape a 
given relationship with nature. From this point of view, the current –narrow- use of the term ‘relational 
values’, though intuitively appealing, might be confusing. Our typology of relational models links to (but 
it is not restricted to) the most common categories of values used in the valuation literature and calls for 
an improved classification and wording. 
 
2. Background literature and concepts  
Understanding the diversity of human-nature relations requires integrating insights from a variety of 
literatures and bridging disciplinary boundaries. We draw insights from social psychology (through the 
notion of social representations), psychological and cultural anthropology (through the concepts of 
relational or mental models and taboo trade-offs) and ecological economics (through the concepts of 
incommensurability of values and languages of valuation).  
The theory of social representation stresses the links between individual cognition and social processes.2 
It proposes that the ways we perceive and relate to nature, make sense of it, and order it, are influenced by 
cognitive processes that are to a large extent socially constructed [8]. This theory addresses the question 
of how human representations of reality, i.e., how the brain perceives, processes and gives sense to 
stimuli, are socially constructed. Some key tenets of this stream of thought are: (a) individual cognitive 
                                                          
2 The theory of social representation is part of a French intellectual tradition in social psychology that started with 
Émile Durkheim, and to which Jean Piaget also belonged. It was consolidated with the work of Serge Moscovici. 
frameworks are collectively constructed and socially shared; but, (b) these frameworks are not 
deterministic and there is scope for individual variations; thus (c) social representations are enduring 
structures, but they also can be modified through individual will or social processes, e.g., through 
communication, social interaction, education and negotiation. Social representations influence the way 
people ‘objectify’ reality, thus determining what is perceived and what is not. Representations also 
influence the ways people anchor the received stimuli, i.e., how they systematize and classify them into 
pre-existing categories. Social representations also determine the reasoning behind causal relations, 
thereby influencing attitudes and behavior. Whenever there are sufficiently distinct and distant social 
representations of reality (shared by different social groups) conflicts may arise. The notion of 
‘framing’(referring to social representations as cognitive ‘frameworks’) is useful to analyze socio-
environmental conflicts [9]. This notion stresses that the confrontation of different (and hard to reconcile) 
cognitive frames held by disparate social groups is the underlying cause of many conflicts [10]. Hence, 
‘re-framing’ becomes a strategy for attempting conflict avoidance, mitigation, transformation and 
resolution [11, 12].  
In psychological and cultural anthropology, taboo trade-offs3 refer to the difficulties faced by people 
when dealing with trade-offs among different types of value. They arise due to the fact that people are 
highly resistant to certain types of value trade-offs, due to cognitive incommensurability and moral 
stances. People often refuse to make trade-offs between different types of values because it would harm 
their self-image and their own standing within their social group [13]. Trade-offs are more likely to 
become morally impermissible whenever a situation requires people to articulate values using the social 
conventions framed by a given social representation of reality that is not considered to be theirs [13]. 
Similarly, in ecological economics, the terms ‘strong incommensurability of values’ [14] and 
‘lexicographic preferences’ [14] are used to refer to situations when there are strong moral limits to the 
‘fungibility’ of values (the extent to which different type  of values can be exchanged, substituted and 
traded off). Whenever such situations arise, the reduction of values to a single common metric is likely to 
face resistance [16].  
According to the Relational Models Theory, as elaborated initially by Alan Fiske [17], there are four 
elementary ‘models’ that frame social relationships: (1) in the communal sharing model, sociality is based 
on the perception that the set of persons involved in the relation have something in common that makes 
them socially equivalent; (2) authority ranking bases relations on asymmetrical, transitive and linearly 
ordered differences between people; (3) equality matching refers to relations around the allocation of 
additive exchange units, with even balance as the reference point; (4) in the market pricing model, social 
interaction is organized with reference to ratios and rates. These social RMs can be seen as cognitive 
frames or representations and may be conceived as discrete and universal. Each model is associated with 
a particular set of motivational and normative conventions that shape and give meaning to social 
relationships. What varies across cultures is in which situations the social relational models are applied. 
Prescriptions about which model should be applied in a particular situation is a social convention. 
Moreover, power relations influence which of the relational model is dominant in decision-making and 
which ones are deemed inferior or non-appropriate [18]. In this vein, power can be interpreted as having 
                                                          
3 A taboo trade-off is an "explicit mental comparison or social transaction that violates deeply-held normative 
institutions of certain forms of relationship and of the moral-political values that derive from those relationships" 
([13] p. 256). 
the capacity to enable, promote and/or impose a given relational model as ‘common knowledge’ via 
cultural practices, customs and habits [18].  
3. Human-nature relational models 
Human-nature interactions are configured by a complex arrangement of social conventions held by social 
groups in a particular period of time. Human-nature RMs are cognitive frames that give shape to 
relationships between people and nature. As in the case of Fiske’s social relational models [16], we argue 
that there is also a finite number of cognitive frames underpinning human-nature RMs, and that they can 
be classified using discrete categories. The idea of human-nature RMs as cognitive frameworks that shape 
perceptions about nature and behaviour towards it is closely linked to the concept of “mental models”, 
which are also applied to socio-environmental issues [19; 20]. 
We propose seven elementary human-nature RMs, easily identified across cultures. While our typology is 
not necessarily exhaustive, we believe it covers the main cognitive structures underpinning human-nature 
relations, as described in a scattered way in the literature. Our classification has some similarities with the 
typology of values of nature proposed by Stephen Kellert [21]. But whereas Kellert’s typology deals with 
what he calls "values"4, we consider that such classification mixes up relational models (e.g. utilitarian) 
with some dimensions of the grammar of such models (see below for a definition). For instance, the type 
of value he coins as ‘symbolic’, i.e., nature as a source of language and imagination, is present across the 
seven RMs we propose, though the use of language and symbols vary considerable across them. 
We argue that individuals apply different RMs towards different ‘entities’ of the natural world or to the 
same entity in different situations, depending on the historical and social-ecological context of interaction. 
It is also possible that an individual shifts from one RM to another over time, as a result of learning, 
social interaction or communication. Human-nature RMs are shared by social groups as a way of group 
identification and mobilization, particularly so whenever socio-environmental conflicts arise.  
Table 1 presents (and Figure 1 illustrates) seven human-nature RMs, each with their own grammar. The 
literature of social psychology dealing with relational models uses the term ‘grammar’ as a metaphor for 
‘the social conventions, rules, and norms that specify how and when and with respect to whom relational 
models apply’ (p.633) [22]. We follow the same notion, and propose that the grammar of human-nature 
RMs is composed of at least five basic dimensions. These dimensions are different domains 
characterizing human-nature relationships. Each of them is governed by a particular set of social 
conventions.  
 
The ontology dimension refers to what Descola [23] calls the ‘mode of identification’, namely, the 
cognitive structure or social representation that defines the boundaries between the self and the otherness. 
Here we identify three aspects within such dimension: (a) the degree to which society and nature are 
                                                          
4 The categories in to which Kellert classifies values are: Aesthetic, dominionistic,humanistic, moralistic,  
naturalistic, negativistic, scientific, symbolic and utilitarian 
differentiated; (b) whether non-human entities are considered to have agency; and (c) how nature is 
positioned (e.g., inferior, equal or superior) vis-a-vis humans. Western societies in general and western 
science, in particular, are characterized by separating nature from people and human from non-human 
beings [24], which necessarily imposes limits to our cognitive capacity to interpret other knowledge 
systems and human-nature interactions in other cultures. Goal orientation refers to the overall societal 
goals guiding decision-making, and largely determines the evaluative criteria. Emotional drivers are a 
distinctive and unpreventable element of human-nature relations [25].  Here we understand emotions in a 
broad sense, as feelings and states of mind that steer behavior and decisions, as opposed to rational 
thinking. Practices refer to codified social conventions that set normative boundaries, particularly about 
the allocation of rights and responsibilities. They dictate what can and cannot be done in a particular 
relational setting based on dominant moralities. Lastly, the main mode of interaction summarizes the way 
the relationship is concretized or operationalized.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Below we briefly explain the main features characterizing the elementary typologies of human-nature 
RMs: 
Detachment is dominated by indifference towards nonhuman entities, either because they are not 
perceived or because they are considered irrelevant. This relational model might be the consequence of 
ignorance and lack of experience. Some authors have warned that current technological and urbanization 
trends might be associated with a distancing of humans from nature [26], resulting in major emotional, 
attitudinal and behavioral changes in our interaction with it [27]. The cognitive consequences of declining 
contact with the natural world and the extent to which contemporary urban life leads to alienation towards 
nature is a subject that has not received sufficient academic attention. We hypothesize that the rising use 
of information technology and urbanization will increasingly be associated with the perception of the bulk 
of natural entities as abstract and distant objects, rendering them irrelevant or invisible.  
Domination derives from a sense of human entitlement over nature and fear (sense of threat). Nature is 
seen as a space to be conquered, as a category opposed to ‘civilization’. Hostility and annihilation are 
distinctive under this mode of interaction. We might associate this model with ‘predatory naturalism’, as 
described by Descola [23], characterized by both a clear society-nature distinction and an antagonistic 
vision towards nature, which is perceived as an obstacle to ‘progress’. The clearing of large tracts of 
forest in the European Middle Age [23] and the mass devastation of forests during the colonial time in 
Brazil [28] can be seen as processes driven by this relational model. 
Devotion is characterized by hierarchical relations. Natural entities are conceived as having agency and 
divine properties, above humans. Religious rituals and taboos are the basis of social conventions that give 
meaning to and shape human-nature relationships. For example, in Southern Indian sacred groves 
biodiversity conservation is not a goal in itself, but a byproduct of complex religious practices closely 
intertwined with the local ecology [29; 30].  
In the Stewardship model, the natural entity is perceived as not having agency but there is no clear-cut 
subject-object distinction, since humans are seen as part of (and dependent on) nature. This 
interdependency is the basis for human responsibility towards nature. Such sense of responsibility is 
expressed in nature-centered management rules and self-imposed behavioral limits. The metaphor of Gaia 
[31] and the ethical precepts behind the agro-ecological movement could seen as reflections of this 
relational model [32].  
Wardship shares with the stewardship model the sense of human restraint for the sake of nature's 
protection, but it has a preference for either wilderness and pristine states or control over natural entities. 
This relational model leads to the promotion of protected natural spaces from which human activities 
should be removed, or in caring and managing animal or vegetal species for non-utilitarian purposes. It 
can also be associated with the notion of benevolent patronage bestowed by humans on natural entities 
[23]. In this model, humans hold responsibility for the custody or nature, which is seen as a distinctive 
entity with its own (intrinsic) rights. 
The utilization model underlies the appropriation of nature's goods and services, mostly via extraction 
and consumption. It is dominated by a utilitarian logic, which might lead either to an exploitative or 
preservationist use of nature, and often to the commoditization of its properties. It is strongly associated 
with instrumental values [33]. This model underpins the green economy and the ecosystem services 
metaphors [34]. The core elements are the utilitarian stand towards the natural environment and a clear 
society-nature distinction.  
Ritualized exchange arises in situations where humans allocate agency to a natural entity, and engage in 
an exchange not governed by considerations of proportionality and ratios but by ritualized codes of 
equality, balance and reciprocity. For example, traditionally the Maya group Itza (from Guatemala) 
assume that in order to exploit natural resources through plant collection, hunting, agriculture, etc. they 
had to ‘pay’ the guardian spirits (yum-il) through ritualized food offerings [35]. The Tukanoan indigenous 
group of Colombia are reported to follow the principle of strict equivalence and reciprocity between 
humans and non-humans, who share a natural environment that has a finite amount of ‘generic vitality’. 
Exchanges must take place so as to compensate non-humans for the share of vitality that has been 
diverted from them in the process of food procurement by humans. It is believed that both humans and 
non-humans contribute jointly, through reciprocal exchanges, to the general equilibrium of the cosmos 
[36; 23]. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The grammar of each of the seven relational models is reflected in the combination of criteria for 
evaluation and the discourse used for political mobilization, both derived from social conventions and 
moral motives. This is what in ecological economics has been called ‘languages of valuation’ [36]. Which 
model is expected to be applied in a given situation is a social convention that might vary substantially 
among cultural backgrounds and/or among social groups.  Applying a particular relational model to 
situations that are expected ─ given prevailing social conventions─ to be governed by a different model 
often leads to moral outrage and taboo trade-offs.  
Socio-environmental conflicts are generally characterized by situations where there is not an overarching 
principle (common among stakeholders) for setting social goals. Confronted social groups around a socio-
environmental conflict typically make use of their own discourses, e.g., markets vs rights, and promote 
their desired relational model in specific contexts while trying to gain social legitimacy. When the RMs 
held by different social groups are incommensurable, aggregation of values becomes extremely 
challenging or impossible. In such situations, conflicts can become intractable and no socially optimal 
solution may be found. In such cases however, conflict resolution through social learning may still be 
possible. Learning would imply being exposed to different RMs, each with their own grammar and 
language of valuation, and being able to empathize and negotiate meanings, social goals and decision-
making mechanisms [38].  
Importantly, RMs influence not only how the problem is perceived (cognitive framing), but also the 
notion of justice held, as well as the considered policy options and discourses for social mobilization [39]. 
Cognitive divergence caused by discrepancy of RMs is at the root of the intractability of many socio-
environmental conflicts. People may not only disagree about the intervention at stake or how the problem 
is conceived, but also about how to deal with such disagreements. For example, in conflicts around 
mining projects with potentially high environmental impacts on surrounding ecosystems, local 
populations often prefer a local referendum as a decision making tool, while mining companies frequently 
prefer the adoption of a compensation rationale [40]. The key point is that such choices do not only reflect 
different strategies in conflict management, but most importantly different ways of relating to nature and 
languages of valuation.  
 
 
4.  Implications for valuation  
There are various key implications of taking the perspective of human-nature RMs in valuation.  
 
First, adopting a relational model approach implies the need to recognize the limits to the social 
acceptance of trade-offs and aggregation of wellbeing indicators given potential incommensurability 
among RMs.  
 
Second, valuation approaches need to embrace pluralism to grasp the diversity of RMs, and to understand 
each of them using their own ‘grammars’, aiming for social learning.  
 
Third, the main goal of valuation should be to identify and disentangle the (not always explicit) RMs 
involved in socio-environmental conflicts. Rather than trying to ‘get the price right’ (by means of eliciting 
people’s economic preferences and aggregating them) the objective should be to ‘map the RMs among 
social groups’, in order to foster social learning under diverse and competing cognitive frameworks about 
nature.  
 
Fourth, in situations where the incommensurability of the RM is a contentious issue, attention should be 
given to procedural aspects and the quality of the decision-making process. In such situations, agreements 
about the process would be a necessary source of legitimacy for any adopted decision, since the final 
outcome might likely be not satisfactory for all the parties involved. 
 
Fifth, any valuation process implies a relation with the subject being valued, and therefore, strictly 
speaking, all values emanate from relational models. What varies is the type of relational model on which 
the different ways of articulating values are manifested.  
 
Last but not least, the complexity entailed in the drivers of environmental change and socio-
environmental conflicts cannot be dealt with using a single grammar or language of valuation. 
Transformation to sustainability cannot simply rely on showing the hidden instrumental values of nature. 
Instead, the role of valuation should be to foster awareness about the ways in which socio-environmental 
interactions depend on different and often competing human-nature RMs, especially in contexts of uneven 
social power relations. Transforming people’s relations towards nature first requires addressing how 
humans cognitively frame their relationships with it, and the intricate mechanisms involved in changing 
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Figure 1. Human-nature relational models: There are seven elementary relational models characterized 
by an underpinning grammar (outer circle), composed of various dimensions: ontology,  mode of 
interaction with nature, goal orientation of the interaction, emotional drivers behind the social 
representation of nature and practices. People and nature can be sharply differentiated (boxes) or not 
(circles), and nature can be perceived as having agency (green), positioned in inferior or invisible ways 







Table 1: An elementary typology of human-nature relational models  











How nature is 
positioned vis- 
à -vis humans   
Goal orientation Emotional 
drivers 
Practices Main mode of 
interaction  
Detachment  Yes 
 
 
No Nature as 
inexistent 
(invisible) 
Preference for urban-and 
technological spaces. Nature 
perceived as not important  
Indifference  Absence of codified practices  Isolationism 







Preference for human 
control over nature. Nature 
perceived as a threat  
Fear Rules and norms based on 
human entitlement (for 
appropriation/annihilation of 
nature) and superiority 
Destruction 
(hostility) 




Preference for situations that 
are believed to be favorable 
for the deities. Nature 




Sacredness yielding religious 




Stewardship No No Humans as part 
of Nature 
Preference for human 
restraint in  order to respect 
nature. Nature perceived as a 






Rules and norms about nature-
centered management and self-








Preference for pristine 
spaces or conditions. Nature 
perceived as a separate 





Rules and norms where 
delimitation of pristine spaces 
or conditions, and biocentrism 








No   Yes Nature as equal  Preference for equality. 
Nature perceived as an 
interactive agent  
Obligation Rules and norms based on the 
sense of partnership 
Partnership  
Seek of balance 
Utilization  Yes No Nature as a 
separate  entity 
with no 
intrinsic rights 
Preference for maximizing 
benefit-cost ratios. Nature as 
a source of goods and 






Rules based on rational 
calculation and market 
orientation 
Utilization 
(exploitative or 
preservationist) 
 
Profit-
maximization  
 
 
